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Common Sense on Standards of Proof 
Kevin M. Clermont* 
Nier l’existence des sentiments 
tièdes parce qu’ils sont tièdes, c’est 
nier le soleil tant qu’il n’est pas à 
midi. La vérité est tout autant dans 
les demi-teintes que dans les tons 
tranchés. 
 
—Gustave Flaubert to Louise 
Colet, December 11, 1846** 
ABSTRACT 
The law speaks clearly on the standards of proof, but listeners often 
misunderstand its words.  This Article tries, with some common sense and a 
modicum of multivalent logic, to explain how the law expects its standards 
to be applied, and then to show how the law thereby avoids such 
complications as the conjunction paradox. 
First, in accordance with belief function theory, the factfinder should 
start at zero belief.  Given imperfect evidence, the factfinder will end up 
retaining a fair amount of uncommitted belief.  As evidence comes in, though, 
the factfinder will form a belief in the truth of the disputed fact but also form 
a disbelief, or a belief in the fact’s falsity.  At the close of evidence, the 
standard of proof requires only comparing belief and disbelief.  For 
example, the civil standard, rather than asking whether a fact more likely 
than not happened according to traditional probability theory, asks whether 
the factfinder believes in the fact’s happening more than the factfinder 
believes that the fact did not happen.  The burdened party need not push 
proof above fifty percent by dispelling the phantoms of every possibility, and 
the opponent need not generate a competing version of truth but can instead 
 
* Robert D. Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University.  I thank Zach Clopton and Dale Nance 
for their comments.   
** GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, CORRESPONDANCE: PREMIÈRE SÉRIE (1830–1846) 417 (1926) (“To 
deny the existence of lukewarm sentiments because they are lukewarm is to deny the sun 
when it is not at noon.  Truth lies as much in its shadings as it does in vivid tones.”). This 
epigraph captures the essence of multivalent logic. 
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rely on denial to demand that the burdened party generate a belief. 
Second, belief and disbelief being nonadditive partial truths, the 
mathematical result is that one cannot combine beliefs by traditional 
probability theory, as by using the product rule designed for conjunction of 
betting odds.  Instead, one should use fuzzy logic, including its rule that 
conjoined likelihood equals the likelihood of the least likely element.  Linking 
the elements in a chain tells a story that is as likely as its weakest link. 
Consequently, if each element of a claim or defense passes the standard of 
proof, the conjunction of elements will pass the standard of proof.  The 
conjunction paradox thus vaporizes for factfinding, just as the law has 
always maintained.  The law found the way to decide in accord with our best 
knowledge of the facts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The conjunction paradox has legs.  For almost a century it has received 
lots of attention, and still does.1  It is easy to grasp.  In a civil case, say, the 
plaintiff needs to prove two elements, a and b.2  Assume she proves element 
a to 0.70 and b to 0.60, whatever that means.  According to American law, 
she wins, having proven each element by a preponderance.3 Paradoxically, 
she should lose according to American law professors, supposedly because 
she has proven the conjunction of a and b to only 0.42. 
Despite the niche notoriety of the conjunction paradox, most law 
professors have never thought about conjoining elements until one 
introduces them to the paradox.  Apparently, the law’s element-by-element 
application of the standard of proof has completely accorded with their 
common sense up to that very moment.  Then suddenly and ironically, the 
law professors’ “common sense” demands the application of traditional 
probability’s product rule and induces their immediate condemnation of the 
law’s result as being illogical.  That is, almost every law professor who 
finally contemplates the problem accepts as a matter of common sense that 
the law’s approach is paradoxical; indeed, a few of the hardiest will then 
 
 1  The best statement of the paradox appears in Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the 
Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1385–88 
(1985).  An early rendition of the paradox lies in the innovative JEROME MICHAEL & 
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 140–43 (1931) (also equating 
preponderance with the p > 0.50 standard for the first time, according to John Leubsdorf, The 
Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1579 
n.45 (2015)).  More recent scholars reflexively invoke the paradox.  E.g., DALE A. NANCE, 
THE BURDENS OF PROOF 74–78 (2016) (accepting the paradox, although he seemed to later 
renounce the conjunction paradox in Dale A. Nance, Formalism and Potential Surprise: 
Theorizing About Standards of Proof, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1017, 1036–37 (2018)), 
reviewed, Federico Picinali, 9 JURISPRUDENCE 192 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abs
tract=3033818; Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: 
Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893; Edward K. Cheng, 
Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 (2013); Jason Iuliano, Jury Voting 
Paradoxes, 113 MICH. L. REV. 405 (2014); Jonathan J. Koehler & John B. Meixner, Decision 
Making and the Law: Truth Barriers, in 2 THE WILEY-BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING 749, 752 (Gideon Keren & George Wu eds., 2015); Michael S. Pardo, 
Group Agency and Legal Proof: Or, Why the Jury Is an “It,” 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793 
(2015).  The two most recent forays argue at length that the conjunction paradox is real and 
that therefore the law should change to conform to the product rule.  David S. Schwartz & 
Elliott R. Sober, The Conjunction Problem and the Logic of Jury Findings, 59 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 619 (2017); Mark Spottswood, Unraveling the Conjunction Paradox, 15 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 259 (2016).   
 2  “Element” means a finding necessary to a claim or defense under the substantive law.  
See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL 
BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD 191 (2013); Kevin M. Clermont, 
Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic, in LAW AND THE NEW LOGICS 32, 57 (H. 
Patrick Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds., 2017).  
 3  See infra note 49. 
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contort themselves in efforts to find ways to live with the law’s approach.4 
This paradox has long bothered me, because I had grown up to accept 
the law professors’ wisdom on this point.5  Regardless of its practical impact, 
the conjunction paradox is of great theoretical importance.  But over the 
years, my bother has decreased.  In a series of writings over thirty years, I 
have tried to show that there is in fact no paradox.6  The law is correct, and 
so are all the philosophers and logicians who support the law’s result.7  The 
law professors are therefore largely in error.  Their error stems from a lack 
of common sense about standards of proof generally. 
In his Symposium article, Professor Risinger in large part has set the 
professors straight by explaining how to view standards of proof in other 
than the traditional framework of probability theory.8  In this comment on 
 
 4  See Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibility, or 
Belief Function?, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 353, 356 (2015).  The hardiest contortion is the 
relative plausibility theory, which posits (i) that the factfinder constructs the overall story (or 
stories, in some variants of the theory) that the plaintiff is spinning and another story (or 
stories) that the defendant is (or could be) spinning and (ii) that the factfinder then compares 
the two stories (or collections of stories) and gives victory to the plaintiff only if the plaintiff’s 
version is more plausible than the defendant’s.  See Allen & Jehl, supra note 1, at 929–43.  In 
addition to some real advantages, the theory has serious problems.  Most notably, it does not 
track well the law, which tells its factfinders to proceed element-by-element and apply the 
standard of proof to each element, not to create holistic stories and compare them; it further 
diverges from the law by compelling, or at least imposing a practical obligation on, the non-
burdened party to choose and formulate a competing version of the truth, even though the law 
allows the defendant to stand mute and still prevail.  Also significantly, the theory gives no 
reason in logic for narrowing the focus to certain stories, and no explanation for how to 
compare stories when, say, the plaintiff’s story is strong on all but one element.  See Clermont, 
supra, at 358–60. 
 5  See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A 
BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 669–72 (6th ed. 1990) (my introducing discussion of the 
paradox to our casebook, a discussion that evolved until its elimination in the eleventh edition 
of the book in 2014).   
 6  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 5 n.4 (citing my seven previously published articles 
on standards of proof); see also Clermont, supra note 2 (subsequent article on multivalent 
logic); Clermont, supra note 4 (subsequent article on belief functions). 
 7  See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 89–91, 265–67 (1977) 
(arguing that the conjunction of two or more propositions has the same inductive probability 
as the least likely conjunct); BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 
359–61 (1948) (arguing comparably that his “degrees of credibility” do not follow the product 
rule of traditional probability); Didier Dubois & Henri Prade, A Set-Theoretic View of Belief 
Functions: Logical Operations and Approximations by Fuzzy Sets, in CLASSIC WORKS OF THE 
DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 375, 403 (Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu 
eds., 2008) (rejecting the application of “arguments deriving from the study of statistical 
experiments”); Susan Haack, The Embedded Epistemologist: Dispatches from the Legal 
Front, 25 RATIO JURIS 206, 217–18 (2012) (arguing comparably that her “degrees of warrant” 
do not follow the product rule of traditional probability); John MacFarlane, Fuzzy 
Epistemicism 12–22 (Oct. 9, 2008), http://johnmacfarlane.net/fuzzy-epistemicism.pdf 
(arguing against the product rule and in favor of the MIN rule). 
 8  D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 
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his article, I shall sketch an alternative to traditional probabilities that is 
similar to his.  I shall then go a step farther to show how the conjunction 
paradox reveals more professorial misunderstandings.  Although my prior 
writings provided formal proofs and long explanations on the nonexistence 
of any paradox as to conjunction, they have unfortunately convinced 
virtually no one in the legal academy.  I keep running into the wall of 
“common sense.”  So now I want to take another stab at a short, 
commonsensical explanation of standards of proof. 
The pivotal point of my common-sense explanation entails the 
realization that factfinders do not announce the odds of an element being 
true, that is, of its existing in an external and potentially discernible real 
world.9  Factfinders instead give their degree of belief in the element’s truth 
based on actual proof-based knowledge.  Odds and beliefs are different 
quantities, subject to different rules for conjunction.  Beliefs are not some 
sort of squishy personal feelings.  Instead, factfinders form their beliefs 
based on the available evidence.  Those beliefs express a degree of certainty 
about the state of the real world.10  Factfinders might believe a fact to a 
greater degree than they believe its opposite, even if they would not be 
willing to bet on it assuming the truth were somehow going to be revealed.  
The reason is that the factfinders’ allocation between belief and disbelief 
might leave most of their belief uncommitted, while the bettor must commit 
total belief between yes and no. 
II. SINGLE ELEMENT 
We first need a word of orientation.  I am talking about applying a 
standard of proof to find a fact.  I refer to factfinding in its broad sense, as 
covering anything that a court or any institution subjects to a proof process 
in order to establish what the system will treat as truth.  The subject includes 
not only yes-or-no facts but also vague and normative terms like “negligent,” 
as well as many other nonbinary opinions and applications of law to fact.  
But let me focus mainly on the task of finding a historical fact that constitutes 
a single element of a claim or defense. 
I am not talking here about the factfinder’s initial processing of the 
evidence to form a belief of some strength.  We do not know exactly how 
this processing task is performed, although introspection, logic, and 
psychology suggest that the factfinder takes into account the weight and 
credibility of the evidence and then applies some intuitive techniques in 
nonquantitative and approximate fashion to form the belief.  The precise path 
 
(2018).   
 9  See D. Michael Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of Evidence and 
Proof, 47 GA. L. REV. 801 (2013) (treating the necessary philosophical assumptions).   
 10  See NANCE, supra note 1, at 42–57 (discussing “epistemic probability”).   
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does not matter for present purposes.  Instead, my interest is in the 
subsequent evaluation of the processed evidence against the standard of 
proof, the required measure of sureness in an uncertain world, that the law 
has specified for the particular element.11 
I am talking about logic in connection with the standard of proof.  We 
tend to forget that every logic system rests on a series of naked assumptions.  
The way a logician begins to work is to assume a basic representation of the 
world, and then to specify a small group of operators, like conjunction, that 
suffice to generate an internally sound and complete logic system.  The 
logician finally tests the system to see if it makes sense of our world and 
hence can be useful.  All thinkers accept that there are multiple valid logic 
systems.  For any task, we have to choose the most appropriate logical 
system.12 
A. Bivalence 
One thing is clear: the confused law professors are using classical 
bivalent logic, which posits that all propositions in the world are either true 
or false.13  Their usage is proven by their turn to traditional probability for 
treatment of random uncertainty as to bivalent outcomes.  In particular, their 
usage is proven by their intuitive application of the probabilist’s product rule, 
which governs in a bivalent world.  Their use of bivalent logic is perfectly 
natural because such logic is dominant in our received manner of thinking. 
Its use is quite helpful in picturing the factfinding process.  But it will get 
one in trouble if used for more than an image, as when one starts using it as 
a basis for calculations. 
If one wants to go farther than simple imaging of the factfinding 
process, one needs to think more about what factfinding produces.  We 
would love to know if a fact happened or did not happen, but the fact being 
the subject of trial means we cannot know for sure what really happened.  
The factfinder will never be able to know a historical fact as being absolutely 
true or false.  Thus, the hypothetical odds of the fact being completely true 
rather than completely false is a measure of little usefulness to legal actors. 
 
 
 11  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 124–27. 
 12  See THEODORE SIDER, LOGIC FOR PHILOSOPHY 1–2, 6–11, 72–73 (2010). 
 13  The semantic principle of bivalence holds that a proposition P is either true or false.  
Thus, not-P is not divided into further sets, but constitutes a single set called false.  This 
principle underlies two-valued logic.  It is indeed the intended (although not necessary) 
semantic of all classical logic, so that classical logic tends to induce bivalent thinking.   
Classical logic’s slightly different, syntactic law of the excluded middle holds merely that a 
proposition P is either true or not true.  Bivalence implies the law of the excluded middle, but 
the converse is not true.  See Peter Suber, Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle (1997), 
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/pnc-pem.htm. 
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What legal actors need is a way to represent their state of knowledge as 
to the fact.  They need the best evidence-based estimate of truth in a world 
where uncertainties will persist.  They need to move on with life while 
making the best decisions about what happened in the past.  In establishing 
facts in the courtroom we will never know the full truth, because all we can 
ever find is a degree of truth.  We are not concerned with whether something 
is fully true—whether a truth value of 1.00 will turn up—but whether it 
seems to have a sufficient truth value to support liability.  Thus, the factfinder 
should form a belief in how true it is.  The belief does not assert the fact to 
be completely either true or false, but rather holds it to be partly true and 
partly false.  This measure of belief in a is useful, while the percentage 
chance of a = 1.00 in a bivalent world is not. 
Let us say that our knowledge of the world, and rather our justified 
belief as to a and to b, is that a = 0.70 and b = 0.60, speaking unrealistically 
but just for the moment in terms of decimals.  These numbers represent our 
degree of beliefs in a and b, not of the odds that somehow a will turn out to 
be 1.00 or b will turn out to be 1.00.  The beliefs depend on what was proven, 
not the probability of divining the unknowable.  The beliefs are all that one 
can say about the past, and therefore acting on that state of our knowledge is 
our best course. 
There are a variety of routes to systematizing this insight.14  But the 
least steep route is multivalent logic, including its most familiar variant 
called fuzzy logic, which expresses propositions as true to a degree between 
0 and 1.  Here is a logician’s neat anecdote that expresses how multivalent 
logic fulfills the factfinder’s needs: 
        Consider Albert Einstein.  As the great physicist lay dying, 
he uttered a sentence just before he passed away.  Einstein had 
dying words.  He spoke them in his native tongue, German, the 
language in which he was by far the most comfortable expressing 
himself.Unfortunately, he passed away in New Jersey and the only 
person who heard him was a nurse who spoke no German. So, we 
will never know what Einstein’s last words were.But there is a fact 
of the matter. There is a sentence which is the last one ever spoken 
by Einstein.  That’s a truth of the world; it’s just a truth we’re 
unable to know.  What was Einstein’s final thought on Earth?  Any 
claim that it was some particular sentence is either true or false.  
But there is a difference between what it is and what we know 
about it.  [Multivalent] logic does not seem apt for describing what 
is, but it does seem appropriate for talking about our knowledge—
 
 14  The most systematic alternatives, which lead to the same results as mine, are Cohen’s 
inductive probabilities (see COHEN, supra note 7), and Shafer’s belief functions (see GLENN 
SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE (1976)). 
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and our lack thereof.15 
B. Multivalence 
Thus, another thing is perfectly clear: we need not invent a system for 
thinking about beliefs in multivalent terms, because the accepted non-
classical system called multivalent logic already exists.  Often it is deployed 
to handle vague terms, like “tall.”  But it extends to degrees of truth. 
The distinction between bivalence and multivalence appears through 
the distinction between crisp and fuzzy sets.16  If a classical probabilist says, 
“There is a 30% chance that Tom Cruise is tall,” the speaker supposes that 
Tom is either tall or short in a world with just two crisp sets, and on the 
available evidence he thinks that it is only 30% likely that upon accurate 
measurement Tom would end up in the tall category rather than the short 
category.  But when a multivalent logician says, “Tom’s degree of 
membership within the set of tall men is 0.30,” the speaker means that Tom 
is not very tall at all.  Both statements can be accurate and informative when 
appropriately deployed.  But the difference between them is real and 
considerable.  It derives from the fact that the probabilist is assuming 
bivalence, so that one is tall or short, while the multivalent logician is 
speaking of a world where one can be more or less tall. 
Within its realm, nobody contests how multivalent logic should 
operate, at least in general terms.  Multivalent logic nicely handles the 
meaning of vague and even normative terms.  The sticking point is law 
professors’ resistance to choosing multivalent logic for measuring and 
manipulating likelihood of past facts.17 
Nonetheless, one can express a sort of multivalent likelihood of truth, 
just as one can multivalently express tallness.  Even the purest past facts, 
ones that look to something like whether an event occurred, are more 
complicated than they appear.  One begins to unpack them by recognizing 
that past facts most often appear to us not as true or false, but instead as 
something falling between completely true and completely false, which we 
can call a partial truth.  A partial truth can be expressed in terms of its degree 
of membership in the fuzzy set of true facts.  Such expression is not 
predicting the probability of absolute truth, but instead is measuring a 
factfinder’s judgment, based on the evidence available, about how likely true 
a particular proposition is.  It represents not a percentage chance, but a partial 
truth.  A 60% belief in an act’s occurrence, when we have no way of 
discovering the absolute truth about the one-shot past event, is epistemically 
 
 15  STEVEN GIMBEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC 530–31 (2016). 
 16  See SIDER, supra note 12, at 12–23 (introducing set theory).  Fuzzy set theory is a 
common way to represent and work with fuzzy logic. 
 17  See, e.g., Schwartz & Sober, supra note 1, at 637. 
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indistinguishable from a 0.60 membership in the set of true occurrences, or 
for that matter a 0.60 membership in the set of tall men.18 
The law reveals its acceptance of multivalence’s partial truths in its 
instructions to factfinders.  It makes no distinctions among kinds of facts, but 
instead treats historical facts just as it treats vague or normative findings.  It 
treats random uncertainty just as it treats imprecision.  This approach—
evaluating all facts in the same manner regardless of their nature and 
regardless of which of the various kinds of uncertainty the law faces—makes 
sense only if the law has accepted multivalent logic. 
The law must eventually act on the partial truths it accepts.  To facilitate 
this step, there exists a compatible mathematical system for handling 
multivalent beliefs, called belief function theory.19  Its imagery nicely 
captures and expresses in an easy and comprehensible way the uncertainty 
resulting from scarce or conflicting evidence concerning the likelihood of 
past facts.  It also captures and expresses the uncertainty that flows from 
conceptual imprecision.  The degree of membership in a fuzzy set expresses 
some of all that uncertainty, but fuzzy set theory treats second-order 
uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the actual estimate of degree of 
membership, in the third dimension of a so-called ultra-fuzzy set.20  Belief 
functions instead bring second-order uncertainty front and center into a 
single measure of indeterminacy, just as legal factfinders intuitively do.  One 
could say for belief functions, “same theoretical basis, better image for legal 
factfinding.” 
Under belief function theory, a belief in a can range anywhere between 
0 and 1. Likewise, belief in not-a, which is disbelief of a, or equivalently 
active belief in a’s contradiction, falls between 0 and 1.  Defects in evidence 
 
 18  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 163–64 (“The inclusiveness of fuzzy logic suggests 
its use for each fact and for combining evaluations of different facts.  Indeed, it can effortlessly 
express even a traditional probability as membership in a set, that is, probability is the degree 
to which the imagined universe of all tests would belong to the set of positive results.  This 
compatibility is essential.  It allows easy combination of a randomly uncertain set with an 
imprecise set, in accordance with fuzzy logical operators.” (internal citation omitted)); 
Clermont, supra note 2, at 42–48; Nicholas J.J. Smith, Degree of Belief Is Expected Truth 
Value, in CUTS AND CLOUDS: VAGUENESS, ITS NATURE, AND ITS LOGIC 491, 494 (Richard 
Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi eds., 2010) (contending that “uncertainty-based degrees of belief 
and vagueness-based degrees of belief” must be treated as equivalents). 
 19  See Clermont, supra note 4, at 362–69.  The mathematics of belief functions are 
basically compatible with the set theory underlying multivalent logic, as some have shown by 
use of so-called possibility theory.  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 202–03; Franz Huber, 
Belief and Degrees of Belief, in DEGREES OF BELIEF 1, 10–15 (Franz Huber & Christoph 
Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009); cf. Alessandro Saffiotti, A Belief-Function Logic, in AAAI 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 642, 644 
n.3 (1992), https://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/1992/AAAI92-099.pdf (constructing a hybrid 
logic that attaches a quantified notion of belief to classical first-order logic). 
 20  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 162–63. 
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or its absence will affect the degree of belief in a and in not-a. Also, on the 
basis of incomplete, inconclusive, ambiguous, dissonant, or untrustworthy 
evidence, some of the factfinders’ belief should remain indeterminate. Thus, 
in factfinding, we ask how much we believe a to be a real-world truth based 
on the evidence, as well as how much we believe not-a—while remaining 
conscious of indeterminacy and so recognizing that part of our belief will 
remain uncommitted. In other words, a belief and a belief in its contradiction 
will normally add to less than one, making belief function theory a so-called 
nonadditive system.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let a be an element of the claim. The zone between Bel(a) and 
Bel(not-a) represents the uncommitted belief. Indeed, any case starts with 
the whole range of belief standing as uncommitted. The proper 
representation of lack of proof is zero belief in the plaintiff’s position—but 
also zero belief in the defendant’s position. As the plaintiff introduces proof, 
some of the factfinder’s uncommitted belief should start to convert into a 
degree of belief in a’s existence, and almost inevitably the plaintiff’s proof 
will also have the inadvertent effect of generating an active belief in at least 
the slightest possibility of its nonexistence. If the defendant introduces proof, 
whether in the form of negation or as part of an alternative and inconsistent 
account, the degree of active belief in a’s nonexistence would presumably 
grow. Indeed, the very clash of beliefs could diminish the degrees of belief 
in a and not-a. 
When we say at the end of the evidence that Bel(a) = 0.40, we are 
not saying that the belief in not-a = 0.60.  We are saying only that the proof 
is such that to a degree of 0.60, a has not been proven to be true, which could 
represent uncommitted belief.  Imperfect evidence means that part of our 
belief will remain uncommitted, with only the remainder divided between 
Bel(a) and Bel(not-a).  So, the belief in a’s falsity would usually be smaller 
than 0.60. In the diagram, Bel(not-a) = 0.20.  It does not equal 1−Bel(a), a 
measure that expresses only the maximal possibility, or plausibility, of not-
a. 
 
 21  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 151, 187, 203; Rolf Haenni, Non-Additive Degrees of 
Belief, in DEGREES OF BELIEF 121, 121–27 (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 
2009); Ron A. Shapira, Economic Analysis of the Law of Evidence: A Caveat, 19 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1607, 1613–16 (1998) (distinguishing additive from nonadditive). 
CLERMONT (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:29 PM 
2018] COMMON SENSE ON STANDARDS OF PROOF 1067 
If you wanted to get the odds for betting on a, you would somehow 
have to allocate the uncommitted belief to a and not-a.  You can bet with 
very little information in hand, but you nevertheless must allocate all belief 
between the two possible outcomes, in order to place your bet accordingly.  
You would do so by performing what is called a pignistic (or betting) 
transform from the credal (or belief) stage. 
A step that looks like a pignistic transform is to normalize the 
beliefs, by scaling the quantified Bel(a) and Bel(not-a) up proportionately so 
that together they equal 1, and thereby moving the uncommitted belief back 
into another dimension.  The partial truths are then expressed as normalized 
likelihoods.  In the diagram, normalizing Bel(a) = 0.40 and Bel(not-a) = 0.20 
would yield a = 0.67 and a’s complement = 0.33. Although these numbers 
look like odds, they are not odds.  They are an expression of the beliefs in 
fuzzy terms.  That is, 0.67 is the best first-order estimate of the provability 
of a, with the second-order uncertainty relegated to a different dimension.  
Thus, fuzzy logic is still a nonadditive system.22 
As I shall show in the next section, one need not quantify beliefs in 
order to work with them, and indeed usually should not.  But if one desired 
to quantify a particular proposition, one could express a belief as its degree 
of membership in the set of true facts.  Given humans’ limited ability to 
evaluate likelihood, one should express the belief in words drawn from a 
coarsely gradated scale of likelihood, rather than speaking in 
misrepresentative terms of decimals.  Here is an appropriately gradated scale 
that utilizes natural language and captures the fuzzy imprecision of beliefs: 
(1) slightest possibility, (2) reasonable possibility, (3) substantial possibility, 
(4) equipoise, (5) probability, (6) high probability, and (7) almost certainty.23 
Indeed, the intuitive normalizing process explains how we law 
people can so easily speak in percentage terms and translate the standard of 
proof into a form such as p > 50%.  Resort to the nonnumerical scale would 
make people sound even more lawyerly.  The bottom line is belief function 
theory adapts itself easily to imaging proof in just the way that law professors 
have traditionally done.  Nothing too radical so far! 
The reason for the air of familiarity is that multivalent logic in any 
of its forms can be made to look much like bivalence plus probability.  
Multivalent logic has this capacity because it is the more general system.  It 
includes bivalent logic as a special case.  That is, a world of things having to 
be either black or white is merely a special and extreme case of worlds 
actually shaded in grays. 
 
 22  See supra note 21.  
 23  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 166–68.  
CLERMONT (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:29 PM 
1068 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1057 
C. Standard of Proof 
The discussion of belief functions leads naturally to a discussion of 
standards of proof. Belief functions enable us to restate the accepted view of 
the standards with a precision that heightens understanding.  In a civil case, 
rather than misleadingly asking whether a fact is more likely than not true, 
the preponderance standard is more precisely asking whether the factfinder 
believes the fact is true more than the factfinder believes that the fact is 
false.24 
This approach does not differ radically from traditional conceptions 
of proof.  Nor is it telling the factfinder to think a new way. It instead tries 
to represent how a factfinder actually thinks, which is the way that current 
law seems to call for thinking and is, moreover, a good way to think.  So, my 
more-likely-than-not restatement conveys an important point: compare 
belief and disbelief, rather than speaking in terms of an abstract possibility 
that the allegation might not be true.  The factfinder should ask the natural 
question that the law seems to pose: do you believe the burdened party’s 
allegation more than you disbelieve it? 
Moreover, this approach to the civil standard of proof does not 
require the non-burdened party to formulate a competing version of the truth, 
other than negation through denial.  My restatement here conforms to the 
law too.  The law, of course, says that the non-burdened party need not 
produce any proof or any story. That party can let develop or make develop 
 
 24  See Clermont, supra note 4, at 373–75.  Clear-and-convincing would be Bel(a) >> 
Bel(not-a).  See id. at 375–76.  This standard is easy to apply because we are used to the idea 
of being clearly convinced of something, in law and in life.  If one wanted to be more explicit, 
one could say that the factfinder needs to be more convinced than believing that the likelihood 
of a exceeds the likelihood of not-a on the scale of seven gross categories of likelihood 
described in the text, believing that it is at least two categories higher.  Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt seems different in kind in its demandingness.  See id. at 376–77.  My 
conjectured formulation requires both (1) that the likelihood of guilt exceed the plausibility 
of innocence, so that Bel(a) > 1−Bel(a), and (2) that there be no reasonable possibility of 
innocence, so that no reasonable person could hold that Bel(not-a) exceeds the lowest 
category.  The first requirement ensures that the proof of guilt is strong enough that the 
factfinder is not swimming in uncommitted belief, thus requiring a completeness of evidence 
not required on the civil side.  The second requirement expresses the idea implicit in the 
criminal standard that the factfinder cannot retain a reasonable belief in innocence or, 
equivalently, a reasonable doubt as to guilt.  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 36–38 
(explaining the meaning of equivalent standards as the burden shifts).  Maybe the two 
requirements satisfy Professor Risinger’s contention that the criminal standard “is intended to 
make even the juror who thinks that the defendant ‘did it,’ in everyday terms, think twice.” 
Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in 
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 199 (1969).  In any event, 
recognizing this difference in kind of the criminal standard refutes those who would treat it 
as an ordinary but very high standard and then argue that the standard is much too demanding 
to be optimal. E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 65, 68 (2008). 
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a belief in the falsity of the burdened party’s version of the truth in the course 
of trial. 
More specifically, the restated standard calls for constructing 
separate beliefs for a and not-a, while leaving some belief uncommitted, and 
then comparing the beliefs in a’s truth and falsity.  That is, a preponderance 
of the evidence means that Bel(a) > Bel(not-a), not that Bel(a) > 0.50.  
Indeed, finding an element to exist will sometimes entail a smallish belief 
found to exceed an even smaller belief in its contradiction.  To continue my 
example, the factfinder should find a if Bel(a) = 0.40 when Bel(not-a) = 
0.20, with the uncommitted belief equaling 0.40. 
Actually, the factfinder need not quantify the likelihoods.  Because 
all the factfinder needs to do is compare the strengths of belief and disbelief, 
the factfinder need never place the belief on a scale.  But if sometime 
motivated to specify a fact’s likelihood, the factfinder should express it in 
the coarsely gradated terms of slightest possibility, reasonable possibility, 
substantial possibility, equipoise, probability, high probability, and almost 
certainty.  Thus, the factfinder in my running example might say that Bel(a) 
> Bel(not-a) because the substantial possibility of a exceeds the reasonable 
possibility of not-a.  That phrasing reveals that the factfinder is not drawing 
a fine line or making a close call, but saying that belief in the partial truth 
palpably exceeds belief in its falsity, that is, it is at least a whole step upward 
in likelihood. 
This reformulation in terms of belief functions has considerable 
advantages over the usual p > 50% formulation.25  First, the reformulated 
burden of persuasion does not require the always troublesome task of 
quantification.26  Second, the civil standard invokes the factfinder’s 
considerable powers of relative judgment, rather than the weak powers of 
absolute judgment on some scale of likelihood.27  Third, it does not require 
the completeness of proof that would be necessary for the burdened party to 
get belief above 50%, but instead is willing to follow the law by resting 
decisions on the evidence presented.28  Fourth, the burdened party need not 
 
 25  See Clermont, supra note 4, at 355–56. 
 26  There are the routine objections to speaking of proof in numerical terms, such as that 
percentages of likelihood are not how people normally think about legal cases and that use of 
numbers can mislead the factfinder and produce imagined conundrums such as the 
conjunction paradox. See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 75–78, 113–14. 
 27  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 62–66. 
 28  See Larry Laudan, Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the 
Criminal Standard of Proof, 11 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 292, 304–05 (2007) (“The trier 
of fact cannot say, ‘Although plaintiff’s case is stronger than defendant’s, I will reach no 
verdict since neither party has a frightfully good story to tell’. Under current rules, if the 
plaintiff has a better story than the defendant, he must win the suit, even when his theory of 
the case fails to satisfy the strictures required to qualify his theory as the best explanation.”).  
On how to justify disregarding the uncommitted belief when the proof of both the fact’s 
existence and nonexistence is weak, see Clermont, supra note 4, at 374, 381–82. 
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fight imaginary fights, trying to disprove every alternative possibility, but 
instead can focus on elevating a and depressing not-a.  Fifth, this 
reformulation of the civil standard of proof conforms to the law by saying 
that the non-burdened party does not need to develop a competing version of 
the truth, but can rely on negation of any essential fact.  Sixth, the non-
burdened party benefits from a tangible burden of production, because the 
burdened party must produce evidence sufficient to generate a belief of 
reasonable possibility.  Seventh, the reformulated standard better achieves 
preponderance’s goal of minimizing error costs, while it gives the parties 
mainly equal treatment.29 
Conversely, a traditionally probabilistic approach with its absolute 
numerical scale is undesirable and unworkable.  It also does not conform to 
the way the law works.  On the one hand, a probabilistic civil standard would 
seem impossibly difficult, as the plaintiff must rise above 50% while 
disproving a virtually unlimited number of alternative states of the world.30  
On the other hand, a probabilistic civil standard simultaneously would seem 
improperly easy, in that the plaintiff, starting with a 50/50 chance, could 
claim victory with a feather’s weight of evidence.31 
            Professor Risinger’s Symposium article delivers a convincing 
rejection of such probabilism.32  Speaking only of yes-or-no past facts, which 
interestingly are the kind of facts that American law professors instinctively 
feel are most suited to traditional probability theory, he develops an approach 
similar to mine.  He focuses on the surprise that the factfinder would feel if 
the found fact hypothetically were revealed to be false, while I stress the 
factfinder’s beliefs in truth and falsity.  He states: “My central claim is that 
people believe something to be true to the extent that they would be surprised 
 
 29  See Clermont, supra note 4, at 375.  Nevertheless, Professor Nance has criticized my 
reformulation.  See NANCE, supra note 1, at 175–78.  His principal criticism of my 
preponderance standard was that expressing the test as Bel(a) > Bel(not-a), or equivalently as 
Bel(a) / Bel(not-a) > 1, is not superior to his expressing the test in terms of probability, p, as 
p / (1−p) > 1.  See id. at 176 n.188.  But that criticism misses the points of the textual 
paragraph.  His test entails the difficult task of quantifying p, and it also entails the six other 
theoretical shortcomings of factfinders’ having to speak in terms of traditional probabilistic 
odds.  But through his more recent study of possibility theory, Professor Nance seems to be 
coming around to a comparative belief-based standard. See Nance, supra note 1, at 17 & n.42. 
 30  See Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2009). 
 31  A huge difficulty for traditional probability is fixing the starting point for factfinding.  
See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 204.  The probabilist might assume that when you know 
nothing, the rational starting point is 50%.  Then, if the plaintiff offers a feather’s weight of 
evidence, he in theory would thereby carry not only his burden of production, but also his 
burden of persuasion.  The real-life judge, however, hands only defeat to the plaintiff with 
nothing more than a feather’s weight of evidence, and does so by summary means.  Why is 
that?  The reason is that the well-behaved factfinder starts not at 50% but at 0.  Then, to get 
past the judge and reach the factfinder requires more than a feather’s weight.  It requires a 
showing not of slightest possibility, but one of reasonable possibility.  That insight makes 
sense of the notions of the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. 
 32  See Risinger, supra note 8. 
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to find out it was false.”33  He calls for the factfinder’s “mental experiment—
not by asking what one would bet on the truth of a belief, but asking directly 
how surprised one would be to find out that the thing believed was false.”34  
He would then formulate the standard of proof as a measurement of that 
surprise against an “inherently imprecise scale,” albeit one perhaps too finely 
gradated: “such as mildly surprised, surprised, quite surprised, greatly 
surprised, astonished, shocked, etc.”35  He explains: “One interesting thing 
about such scales is that they can be easily understood as rank-ordered, and 
therefore having the transitive property of numbers, but as not having any of 
the other properties of mathematization such as additivity.”36  In other words, 
standards of proof should focus on nonnumerical, nonadditive beliefs as to 
the facts rather than on hypothetical bets. 
III. MULTIPLE ELEMENTS 
In describing factfinding on a single element, the difference between 
dealing in probabilities and dealing in beliefs was rather subtle.  I have 
maintained that multivalent beliefs are a sounder representation, because 
they do not rest on the faulty assumption of bivalence.  But as one switches 
to factfinding on multiple elements, one must choose definitively whether to 
combine probabilities or beliefs.  They calculate very differently. 
Even if one accepts beliefs as the sounder representation, one must 
seriously resolve to keep thinking in multivalent terms when combining 
multiple factual elements.  One has to maintain a great mental effort not to 
slip back into the binary thinking that we are so used to employing.  When 
one faces uncertainty as to whether Tom was the perpetrator and as to 
whether a tort was committed, one will find it almost irresistible to start 
multiplying odds.  Here is the vaccine, again: odds and beliefs are 
fundamentally different measures. 
As for odds, which assume bivalence, the complement of the chance 
of a’s being revealed as true is the chance of a’s being revealed as false.  The 
chance of a’s being revealed as false interacts with the chance of b’s being 
revealed as false, so that the chance of a or b being revealed as false goes up 
by a multiplicative amount. 
To resist reversion to bivalent thinking, focus on what a belief is. In 
a sea of uncertainty, it is an island of credence.  A belief is not a probabilistic 
prediction of a complete truth or complete falsity being revealed, but instead 
is a measure of how well proven a proposition is.  It in no way suggests that 
its complement is the belief’s falsity.  That Tom is a 0.70 member of the set 
of tall men does not imply to any degree that he is short.  That any a has been 
 
 33  See Risinger, supra note 8, at 981. 
 34  See Risinger, supra note 8, at 981. 
 35  See Risinger, supra note 8, at 982. 
 36  See Risinger, supra note 8, at 982. 
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proven to a 0.70 belief does not imply that there is any belief in not-a.  
Instead, the complement of the degree proven is the degree not proven, an 
uncertainty that could very well eventually resolve in a way that strengthens 
the belief. 
So, when one combines beliefs, one does not combine the 
complements as the product rule does.  The degree of a’s not being proven 
does not have any effect on or interaction with the degree of b’s not being 
proven.  If one believes a and one believes b, then one believes a and b 
together, although, of course, not more than one believes a or b separately.  
In other words, conjoining knowledge is fundamentally different from 
placing a bet. 
Recall that past facts unknowable with certainty are epistemically 
the same as vague concepts.37  Imagine ten or more historical facts each 
believed to 0.90, which link as necessary elements to form a story.  Should 
you accept that story?  Yes, if you are a historian, even though the product 
rule would put the odds at 35% or less.  Rejecting that path, and instead 
accepting the product rule, would lead to such idiocies as Holocaust denial: 
the denier would wonder how anyone could think that so many events 
conjoined to produce the Holocaust?38  Every accepted story from history 
consists of linked, not multiplied, beliefs.  A legal factfinder should follow 
the historians’ lead in accepting multivalent logic’s lesson to treat beliefs 
differently from odds. 
To sum up, if you believe Tom was the perpetrator and you believe 
a tort was committed, then logically you believe that Tom committed the 
tort.  As I shall next explain, when you want to know how well a and b are 
proven on the current proof—and so whether you should proceed with belief 
in the conjunction—you should look to how well proven the weaker element 
is. 
A. Product Rule 
        The product rule says that the odds of independent events occurring 
together is the product of their individual odds.39  As I have argued, truth 
exists as to past facts, but it is unknowable with certainty; and this reality 
generates no reason for the law to pay attention to the odds of something 
happening that will never happen—the truth of an unknowable fact revealed.  
Then, why should the law use the product rule to find out the odds of repeated 
 
 37  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 38  See Michael Salter, Countering Holocaust Denial in Relation to the Nuremberg Trials, 
in HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE DENIAL: A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 21, 22 (Paul Behrens et 
al. eds., 2017).  See generally EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE IN HISTORY AND LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUES 2–62 (William Twining & Iain Hampsher-Monk eds., 2003); 
WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 352–53 (2d ed. 2006). 
 39  For interdependent events, the probability operation for conjunction is p(a) multiplied 
by p(b|a), so it is still multiplicative. 
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miraculous revelations of truth?  Instead, the law should work with the 
knowledge we have, which comes in the form of beliefs. 
        Mathematically, the reason that the product rule is inappropriate for 
factfinding is that it is premised on a bivalent world with fully committed 
belief.  In that world, a probability gives the additive odds of a being 
somehow revealed to be true rather than false.  The product rule assumes that 
saying a = 0.70 means not-a = 0.30.  If b = 0.60, then not-b = 0.40.  When 
asked the odds of (a AND b), the result is 0.42, while (not-a OR not-b) is 
0.58. 
        However, beliefs in facts do not work that way.  Beliefs are nonadditive, 
so that a plus not-a does not necessarily equal 1 or, in other words, a belief 
in a fact does not imply a certain belief in its falsity.  In technical terms, 
nonadditivity makes the product rule inappropriate mathematically.40 
        Multivalent logic provides the appropriate mathematical rule, to be 
described in the next section.  It is easiest to comprehend in an example 
involving vague terms.  Think of the sets of tall men and of smart men.  Let 
A be the set of tallness among men and B be the perhaps independent set of 
smartness among men.  Tom is a 0.30 member of A and a 0.60 member of B, 
which means something like “Tom is not so tall” and “Tom is fairly smart.”  
To what degree is Tom a member of the set of (tallness AND smartness)? 
One can resolve this question as a matter of intersection of sets.  The question 
becomes how much does Tom belong to the set of tall and smart men. 
        On the one hand, Tom does not get to carry over the higher set-
membership number, because his lack of height drags him down.  On the 
other hand, no one would ever think of multiplying vague measures.  There 
is no reason that the product rule should apply, dragging his membership all 
the way down to 0.18.  This probabilistic result is lower than both his tallness 
level and his smartness level.  It seems to yield, “Because Tom is not so tall 
and Tom is fairly smart, Tom is very likely a very short and/or very dumb 
man.”  Mere application of the product rule seems to have made him very 
short and dumb.  The reason that it calculates the conjunction so low is that 
multiplication of probabilities gives the irrelevant chance that Tom is both 
completely tall and completely smart.  It does not tell us the degree to which 
he is both tall and smart. 
Instead, Tom’s degree of membership in the intersecting set should 
not decrease below the lower of his tallness and smartness levels.  Tom 
seems a 0.30 member of the set of tall and smart men.  The conjunction of 
tall and smart says, “Because Tom is not so tall and Tom is fairly smart, Tom 
is not such a tall, smart man.” 
Perhaps this will appear even more clearly if tallness is 0.70 and 
smartness is 0.70, so that Tom seems obviously a 0.70 member of the set of 
(tallness AND smartness).  And, if his smartness is only 0.60, Tom’s 
 
 40  See Clermont, supra note 2, at 60–64. 
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membership in the set of (tallness AND smartness) drops toward 0.60, not 
precipitously to 0.42. 
The inappropriateness of the product rule will become still more 
obvious as one combines more and more elements in the calculation.  The 
product calculation will approach 0.00, even if all of the values are high.  
What is Tom’s membership in the set of tall, smart, rich, famous, and strange 
men?  The product rule implausibly suggests well under 0.05.  Instead, the 
intersection of sets suggests that the membership should go no lower than 
the minimum membership around 0.30.41 
My argument still holds when one switches from combining vague 
characteristics to combining beliefs.42  A historical fact unknowable with 
certainty can be expressed only as a partial truth.  The partial truth is saying 
how strongly we believe it, often leaving a lot of belief uncommitted.  It 
expresses how true we will treat a fact to be.  The fact is partially true and 
partially not true.  It says nothing about the odds that it will be revealed as 
true, because any such statement would require committing that 
uncommitted belief.  So, how do you combine partial truths?  It would be 
bizarre that you could just apply the product rule that was developed for 
odds.  It would be especially bizarre to bring over the product rule when a 
whole field of logic developed to deal with partial truths and when that field 
rejects the product rule.  For conjunction of beliefs a and b as partial truths, 
it is not appropriate to think of multiplication of odds.43 
 
 41  The product rule would lead to other silliness, such as the aggregation paradox.  See 
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal Responsibility 
for Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261 (2009) (building on the aggregation paradox); 
Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2 (2012) (same).  Theorists 
would have us convict defendants on the basis of a series of almost proven crimes.  But see 
Kevin M. Clermont, Aggregation of Probabilities and Illogic, 47 GA. L. REV. 165 (2012) 
(dismantling the aggregation paradox). 
 42  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 43  The basic difference between beliefs and odds and the applicability of multivalent 
theory even to pure yes /no factfinding are the two biggest things that Professor Allen misses 
in his End-of-History-entitled conception of the conjunction paradox as “a feature of the 
world.”  Ronald J. Allen, The Declining Utility of Analyzing Burdens of Persuasion, 48 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 995, 2 (2018) (page citations and quotations are drawn from the draft of Sept. 
28, 2017, on file with author).  In it, he references our earlier e-mail exchange that I failed to 
heed.  Id. at 1003 n.31.  In that exchange, he announced: “So, my advice to you is to scrap the 
grand ambitions to explain to people like me why we’ve missed the boat for the last 30 or so 
years notwithstanding prodigious effort, including effort to understand precisely what you’re 
discussing here—because I think you’re just wrong about that . . . .”  E-mail from Ronald J. 
Allen to author (Dec. 22, 2011, 19:02 EST) (on file with author).  He is now sticking to his 
guns, proclaiming and re-proclaiming that I am “simply wrong.”  Allen, supra, at 1003, 1007. 
          1. He gets off to a rocky start by misconceiving my whole project.  I do not maintain 
that “changing one’s views of probability will change the external world.”  Id. at 996.  Instead, 
I am proceeding from the sound premise that for any particular task in treating the external 
world, one must choose the appropriate probability tools.  
          2. He then attacks my tools.  He takes particular delight in my water-bottle example, 
which was designed to demonstrate the difference between crisp sets and fuzzy sets.  It 
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B. MIN Rule 
When combining beliefs in the legal elements of claim or defense, 
the sound route is to focus on first-order estimates of how well-proven each 
belief is, while ignoring second-order uncertainties.  The mathematical 
 
involves two bottles marked as having either a 91% probability of being nonpoisonous or “a 
.91 membership in the fuzzy set of potable liquids.”  CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 165.  But he 
misunderstands the example, being misled by his conviction that I want to change the external 
world by methodological commitment.  Incredibly, he believes I am saying that if you think 
of a bottle in fuzzy logic terms, you can magically make “the contents of the bottle change.”  
Allen, supra, at 1005.  No.  I am saying that the two bottle labels are describing two different 
contents.  The parched person crawling in the desert would be smart to attend to that 
difference. 
          3. He next opens his “technical” discussion by accusing me of having “conflated 
(contorted, perhaps) the distinct ideas of probabilistic conjunction in mathematics and set 
intersection in set theory.”  Id. at 1005.  Given that my central point is that these two ideas are 
fundamentally different, it is no surprise that his technical discussion is muddled, drawing 
false distinctions between multivalent logic and belief functions, fuzzy logic and fuzzy set 
theory, and propositional logic’s conjunction and set theory’s intersection.  His excursion by 
string-cite to the subject of fuzzy numbers, which is but an old extension of multivalent logic 
for sophisticated calculations, can have no other purpose than to spread fog.  His introduction 
of fuzzy probability theory as proving me wrong is harder to explain, because I was in fact 
trying to use fuzzy probability theory in my dealing “with mixed probabilistic/non-
probabilistic uncertainty.”  Michael Beer, Fuzzy Probability Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEMS SCIENCE 4047, 4048 (Robert A. Meyers ed., 2009) (“The 
significance of fuzzy probability theory lies in the treatment of the elements of a population 
not as crisp quantities but as set-valued quantities or granules in an uncertain fashion, which 
largely complies with reality in most everyday situations.”).  Although relying almost 
exclusively on Beer, Professor Allen ignores Beer’s embrace of the MIN rule coming from 
so-called imprecise probability theory.  See id. at 4053. 
          4. He takes comfort in the loneliness of my position among law professors.  See Allen, 
supra, at 1013.  But I am not all alone.  Bertrand Russell is a good ally.  Yet Russell might 
not impress someone who treats disagreement by dismissing the late, great Oxford logician 
Jonathan Cohen’s work as “idiosyncratic.”  Id. at 1004 n.35.  But see CLERMONT, supra note 
2, at 180 (discussing “Cohen’s almost impenetrably brilliant book”). 
          5. After misstating vagueness theory, multivalent logic, and my position in a number 
of ways, he comes to a glimmer of realization that we are not so far apart.  See Allen, supra, 
at 1014 (“If Clermont would just drop his fallacious argument about the magical qualities of 
multivalent logic and set theory, we would welcome him into our camp.”).  Here is the irony.  
My approach and his relative plausibility theory both call for comparing the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s positions, without concern for the conjunction paradox.  I try to show by logic 
that the law, with its element-by-element standard of proof, is correct in ignoring the supposed 
conjunction paradox—and that the law’s element-by-element approach is equivalent to 
comparing the plaintiff’s overall account to the defendant’s contradictory position.  He gets 
to the same point by fiat, running roughshod over law and logic to decree that henceforth the 
factfinder should ignore judicial instructions, repeal probability theory, and just compare best 
stories.  See supra note 4 (criticizing his relative plausibility theory).  He resorts to fiat because 
he has failed to realize that when applied to standards of proof, every variety of inference to 
the best explanation, including his theory, implicitly accepts the MIN rule to show that the 
best explanatory story’s conjunction is superior to all competing accounts.   
          In sum, I am not saying that Professor Allen “missed the boat.”  In fact, his prodigious 
rowing has brought us all a long way.  It is just that, like Columbus, he does not know where 
he landed.   
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sophistication of belief function theory, which results from accounting for 
second-order uncertainties, is unnecessarily complicated for the law’s 
purposes.  It is simpler to return to fuzzy logic and to partial truths expressed 
as normalized degrees of likelihood.44  We can then readily prove how to 
conjoin the partial truths.  The conjunction operator for fuzzy logic systems, 
its alternative to the product rule, is the so-called MIN rule: 
 
truth(a AND b) = minimum(truth(a), truth(b)) 
 
The appropriateness of this operator can be formally proven.45  But the 
accompanying figure may help at least to visualize this operator for 
conjunction.46  It indicates the shaded intersection of the two sets A and B, 
where μ gives the degree of membership of a point along the x-axis.  Let the 
x-axis represent some ordering of conceivable states of proof in a particular 
case.  Let z, being some point along the x-axis, represent the proof actually 
admitted in some case.  If z falls within the intersection, the degree of 
membership therein will be the degree of membership in A or in B, whichever 
has the lower membership line at that point z.  As you can see, at z the 
membership in (A AND B) is MIN(A, B), which in the figure would be less 
than 0.50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44  See supra text accompanying note 22; Clermont, supra note 4, at 387–89. 
 45  See Clermont, supra note 2, at 51 n.32. 
 46  The figure comes from Timothy J. Ross & W. Jerry Parkinson, Fuzzy Set Theory, 
Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Systems, in FUZZY LOGIC AND PROBABILITY APPLICATIONS 33 
(Timothy J. Ross et al. eds., 2002); see also id. at 34–36 (extending the MIN rule from a 
common element’s membership in multiple fuzzy sets to the relationship of a’s and b’s 
memberships in different fuzzy sets, which would change the image into a mapping by 
Cartesian product of the multiple memberships onto the same interval of [0,1]). 
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If after proof in a different case the membership in A is 0.70 and the 
membership in B is 0.60, then by fuzzy logic the membership in the 
intersection would be 0.60.  Thinking of intersection of sets might not be that 
helpful, though.  A better image is the links of a chain.47  The proof tells a 
story consisting of elements, which can be strung element-by-element as 
links.  The strength of the chain is the strength of its weakest link.  In other 
words, the conjunction of many fairly true propositions is fairly true, not 
almost completely untrue.  If truth(a) = 0.70 and truth(b) = 0.60, then truth(a 
AND b) = 0.60. 
Accepting this MIN rule for routine use in law makes everything 
simpler.  The same MIN rule applies whether the elements are independent 
or interdependent.  The MIN rule works the same on facts within elements 
as between elements, making any particular division of a claim or defense 
into elements nondeterminative.48  If the standard of proof were applied to 
the whole case, the standard of proof would be satisfied if and only if each 
element meets the standard of proof.  If the factfinder in actual practice 
approaches the case holistically by constructing an overall story, the outcome 
will equate to the outcome from applying the standard element-by-element.  
Therefore, the conjunction paradox disappears, whichever of the leading 
rational or psychological models for processing evidence that one accepts. 
This is not to suggest there is no role for the product rule.  It remains 
appropriate for many sorts of situations, including some legal situations.  If 
the event in question is not vague, and thus readily distinguishable from its 
opposite, and its expected occurrence is subject only to random uncertainty, 
then traditional probability might be the appropriate vehicle to generate odds. 
For a probability example from a non-legal setting: will I twice pick 
a black ball from an urn containing only pure white and pure black balls?  
However, if the fact is vague, and most facts in the world are vague, 
multivalent logic is the way to go.  For a contrasting example that calls for 
multivalence: how black are these grayish balls? 
In the legal arena, even after accepting the MIN rule in general, the 
factfinder will find uses for the product rule, either consciously or intuitively.  
A judge deciding on a preliminary injunction will need to calculate the odds 
of multiple future events, a task for which the judge would find the product 
 
 47  See Clermont, supra note 2, at 64–66. 
 48  Within elements, see supra note 2, the factfinder uses the usual intuitive techniques in 
nonquantitative and approximate fashion to find facts.  But the process of combining facts 
within elements is not dissimilar to the proof process between elements.  To join separate 
facts within the elements (as opposed to reinforcing or contradicting evidence), the factfinder 
uses the same multivalent operator for conjunction.  See CLERMONT, supra note 2, at 158–59, 
191–92; cf. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting multiplication of 
odds).  The apparent criticality of the number of elements thus melts away.  The law splits the 
case into parts that it calls elements and tells its factfinder to proceed element-by-element, but 
does so only to make the factfinder’s path to decision more comprehensible and careful. 
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rule to be appropriate.  Or a jury might have to make predictions in 
connection with remedial issues.  Another kind of example would arise when 
the factfinder needs to manipulate and evaluate statistical evidence.  Or if 
one had to determine whether Einstein’s actual deathbed statement was a 
particular q, the multitude of possible things he might have said would 
probabilistically cause Bel(not-q) to balloon while the uncommitted belief 
remains considerable. 
Nonetheless, our lawmakers have explicitly chosen multivalent 
logic to provide the default operator for combining facts.  By phrasing the 
instruction to factfinders so as to require applying the standard of proof 
element-by-element, the law reveals that it has adopted the MIN rule.49  That 
instruction does not ask the factfinder any overall question.  It does not ask 
what the overall likelihood is.  It does not give instructions on how to 
combine independent or interdependent findings, which would otherwise be 
necessary.  Instead, a rule of law tells the factfinder to determine whether an 
element is likely enough and, if so, to proceed afresh to the next element.  It 
is a rule of law, and not the factfinder’s function, that says the plaintiff shall 
recover once the factfinder finds each element to exist under the standard of 
proof. 
C. Multivalent Conjunction 
Multivalent logic, then, calls for the MIN rule to calculate 
conjunctive likelihood.  And the law has heard that call.  This legal move has 
brought the benefits of simplicity.  But the question remains whether the 
law’s approach produces the “right” answers. 
The right answer depends on the purpose of standards of proof.  
They could serve a moral end, enhance public acceptance of outcomes, or 
further some other process value.  But I accept the dominant view that the 
standards aim at the appropriate error distribution.  In particular, the civil 
 
 49  See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 416–17 (5th Cir. 
1985); 3 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE 
AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 104.01 (6th ed. 2011): 
 
Plaintiff has the burden in a civil action, such as this, to prove every 
essential element of plaintiff’s claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  If plaintiff should fail to establish any essential element of 
plaintiff’s claim by a preponderance of the evidence, you should find 
for defendant as to that claim. 
 
See also Allen & Jehl, supra note 1, at 897–904 (criticizing Dale A. Nance, Commentary, A 
Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 
66 B.U. L. REV. 947, 949–51 (1986) (finding the pattern jury instruction ambiguous)).  Of 
course, the pattern jury instruction also verbalizes the process implicitly imposed on the judge 
when acting as factfinder. 
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standard of preponderance aims at minimizing errors and error costs through 
the pursuit of accuracy.50 
Using the MIN rule yields the most accurate story, indeed, the story 
more likely than all the other possible stories combined.  That is, the 
conjoined story is as likely as the weakest element, which has already 
satisfied the standard of proof if each element is more likely true than false.  
Moreover, the disjunction of the falsities that combines all other possible 
stories is only as likely as the most plausible of the falsities, which has 
already failed the standard of proof.51 
This resolution may sound like magic.  But it follows ineluctably 
from the realization that linking the elements in a chain tells a story that is as 
likely as its weakest link, and so all we have to do is ensure that each link is 
more true than false.  Multivalent logic instructs that this is the way to 
proceed if you want to make the most accurate decision in accord with our 
best knowledge of the facts. 
Getting the most accurate answer gives the most efficient answer, 
and hence the “right” answer.  If instead the standard of proof asked on 
whom the factfinder would bet to win if only we were somehow to stumble 
upon perfect bivalent knowledge, the factfinder should employ the product 
rule.  But there is no reason whatsoever that society should have interest in 
that question.  Basing decisions on the product rule would mean that 
plaintiffs will lose some strong cases that they should have won.  Moreover, 
defendants at fault would not be receiving enough corrective messages.  The 
product rule would lead to more errors.  These errors would detrimentally 
affect economic efficiency. 
Understandably, because society wants to act upon the most accurate 
view of the facts given the knowledge we have, its legal system has chosen 
to go with the MIN rule. 
CONCLUSION 
          What the law mandates on standards of decision, if clearly understood 
and followed, will produce optimal results.  First, the standard of proof on 
an element of a claim or defense should call for a comparison of the 
factfinder’s belief in its truth and belief in its falsity.  Second, the standard 
should be applied separately to each element. 
Indeed, one does not have to carry a lot of multivalent theory around in one’s 
head.  Once one has stopped worrying about the conjunction paradox, one 
 
 50  See Clermont, supra note 2, at 64–66. 
 51  Disjunction is calculated by the so-called MAX rule: truth(a OR b) = 
maximum(truth(a), truth(b)). Thus, if truth(a) = 0.70 and truth(b) = 0.60, the membership in 
the union would be 0.70.  Just as intersection of sets does not cause likelihood to plummet 
wildly, union does not wildly increase likelihood.  The degree of a’s not being proven does 
not have any effect on, or interaction with, the degree of b’s not being proven. 
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no longer needs to master or apply fuzzy logic.  Although belief functions, 
with their uncommitted belief, define the standards of proof, one can 
understand the resultant standards without flights of theoretical fancy.  The 
civil-case standard asks merely whether the factfinder believes that the fact 
is true more than the factfinder believes that the fact is false. 
In any event, nowhere in the analysis of standards does traditional 
probability theory lend a helpful hand.  Instead, the law here is, more or less, 
a matter of common sense. 
 
